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The uneven effects of the climate crisis and the need for decarbonization by reducing fossil fuel 
exploitation and eliminating   subsidies create critical trade-offs and tensions for low-income 
developing countries. Recent reform of fuel consumption subsidies has shown a perennial 
mitigation bias largely imposed by external forces, in particular multilateral agencies and foreign 
governments in the context of the Paris accord. Contradictorily, external pressures to reduce 
subsidies have created competitive markets for multinationals to have a disproportionate role in 
supplying energy products, which foreground the inequities in Haitian society that have spurred 
social and political conflict. Empirical work on energy-subsidy reform and climate policy do not 
sufficiently interrogate the interplay and implications of underlying assumptions, power 
imbalances between domestic and foreign actors, the challenging infrastructural and political 
context of renewable energy promotion, and immediate concerns to address worsening social 
conditions and development priorities. Drawing upon these policy debates, this paper considers 
the recent experience of Haiti to reform its energy subsidies required by the International 
Monetary Fund to enforce austerity. The paper takes a more integrated and critical approach to 
these policy discussions in a context of interconnecting political, socio-ecological crises, and 
climate policy in Haiti. By inductively analyzing Haiti’s main climate and energy policies and 
evidence drawn from field experience, the paper offers a more nuanced understanding of 
decarbonization and energy debates in this extremely vulnerable context. This approach gives 
priority to a more dynamic historical analysis of the socio-political context and factors that seek 
to advance climate justice. 
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1. Introduction  
Since the 2015 Paris Agreement, growing concern by international agencies and climate 
movements have increased pressure to make drastic policy changes that would enable transitions 
towards renewable energy and the phasing out of fossil fuels. The increasing attention to fossil 
fuel use and subsidy elimination have shifted interests away from concerns affecting many low 
income countries that face immediate political and social fallout from the rapid removal of fuel 
subsidies. The large numbers of people in poverty and dependent on low cost fuels to generate 
incomes and meet their day to day living expenses are left in dire straits when such reforms 
occur unexpectedly or without an adequate welfare support system. First, without immediate 
availability of renewable sources of energy already in place to meet the demand, and second 
without the social transfers and redistributive policies that can offer financial and income 
support, these policy shifts can bring about misery. As a result  the mounting policy failures and 
reversals often may worsen the situation.  
In the first place, the policy shifts do not consider the distributional implications at a social level, 
and conversely have little regard to the overall development conditions of the country where they 
are promoted and implemented. These policies, often touted as necessary to meet the demands of 
the climate crisis [1] suffer from a mitigation bias [2,3]. In the Caribbean and other low income 
countries like Haiti, the high cost of energy alongside widespread incidence of energy poverty 
and infrastructural challenges have historically contributed to the high level of carbon-intensive 
energy imports; their entire economic systems are heavily reliant on foreign energy producers 
making the transition to renewables appear distant and fraught with multiple intersecting 
challenges [4–8]. Haiti also exhibits extremely high levels of environmental exposure compared 




with estimates as many as 8,608 from 1980 to 2009 [9]. Recent measures to stem fossil fuels 
subsides has resurfaced concern about who is bearing the burden of the climate crisis and the 
mitigation bias of climate policy expressed in the current financing arrangements meant to 
support  developing countries [10,11]. In 2017, while overall public financial flows to 
developing countries through bi-lateral and multilateral aid channels for climate action increased 
by 44 per cent, only a fifth of financial resources are allocated to adaptation efforts compared to 
mitigation [11]. This stark disparity, while acknowledged in the literature, remain under-
emphasized  in global policy discussions and financing towards climate actions [12,13].  
Moreover, these imbalances mirror the contradictory and conflicting policy priorities of 
developed countries considered most responsible for the climate and ecological disaster which 
continue to subsidize international expansion of fossil fuel energy in developing countries 
[4,5,14]. As shown by the 2017 hurricane season where island nations in the Caribbean were 
devastated by mega storms Maria and Irma, and more recently by Dorian, any focus on climate 
mitigation targets may be misplaced as they do not meet the immediate needs of developing 
countries to stem the disproportionate effects of a changing climate and to  and to increase their 
adaptive capacity in the face of higher sea levels, ocean acidification, loss of livelihoods, and 
more ferocious storms [15,16].  
Through  a number of powerful international institutions, notably the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
the International Energy Agency (IEA), rich Group of Seven (G7) countries dominate the 
subsidy reform debate and are able to disproportionately, using traditional financial and political 
levers, impose indirect actions or sanctions on relatively poorer and institutionally weaker 




been able to make requests for changes to such regimes that have had harmful political and social 
consequences. . Notwithstanding, evinced by the quantum of fossil fuel subsidies that are still 
prevalent in China ($1.4 trillion), United States ($649 billion), Russia ($551 billion), European 
Union ($289 billion), and India ($209 billion) [19], the forceful demands made on low income 
countries get at the heart of the unequal burdens of the costs and benefits towards meeting 
mitigation targets in the Paris Accord [20–22].  
This unequal relationship reflect not only asymmetries between developing countries and 
their rich country counterparts in material and political terms, and in policy debates, but can 
equally aggravate environmental and humanitarian crises and retard  policy actions – a scenario 
well known to Haiti [23]. Eliminating subsidies can thus compound these already pressing 
everyday issues of people satisfying their nutrition and income needs and can trigger a vicious 
cycle and lead to political violence [24]. For instance, removing fuel subsidies can create 
immediate pressures on low-income groups affected by the subsequent rise in fuel costs as their 
livelihoods, dependent on lower prices rendering them unable to tolerate these adjustments 
[25,26]. These dynamics equally manifest as consistent encumbrances on sovereignty in political 
and policy terms [27].  
Anchoring the fuel subsidy the debate, this paper contends therefore that in conformance 
with heterodox political economy that a combination of social, political, historical and 
institutional factors embedded in the economic structure of a country can help  generate these 
potential outcomes. The overreliance on external forces, in this case, energy imports or aid can 
trigger certain sustained violent reactions and simultaneously have institutional effects on the 
quality of policy output. I argue that given the embedded and contradictory forces at play in a 




are intrinsic to climate policy, which can limit its effectiveness. These socio-economic and 
institutional dynamics , often interact with each other and thus have varying yet intersecting 
effects on development needs [28] . External pressures on major policy issues such as climate 
policy can thus have two possible effects: follower-type policies, where the weaker party in the 
relationship conforms to the decision in broad terms, with or without the use of concessions to 
parties affected by the new polices. Second,  agent-centered policies, which may stir outright 
contestation and social disturbance, may include an adaptation of the policy that responds to 
political circumstances to render them feasible (or impractical) in the context or acceptable 
(unacceptable) to the actors with the most veto power to challenge them, and thus become 
embedded in existing inequities. An equal  result may include the reversal of policies or a diluted 
version of the policy that incorporates some concessions and limited political contestation to the 
decision in the long run. 
This is illustrated in Haiti’s recent experience.  Compounded by the fear of defaulting on 
loans and not receiving further international fiscal support, and ensuing political/economic 
uncertainty, the government announced its intention to cut fuel subsidies on petroleum products.   
In the wake of this announcement, violent protests erupted during the summer football World 
Cup, and lasted from July 6 to 8, 2018. Earlier that year, support from the PetroCaribe program 
also came to an end, and triggered increasing worry about  fuel shortages that turned into 
massive protests/political disagreement  around  corruption and social concerns. Given the 
pervasive effects of global phenomena on policy debates in Haiti, these events also foreground 
the unique nexus of climate change and energy subsidy reform.. This paper addresses the 




acknowledges the complexity of these tensions and their implications  in framing an integrated 
analysis.  
Following this introductory section, the paper reviews the literature about the political 
economy of energy poverty, the social and political costs and burdens of mitigation-oriented 
policies relative to low income countries, and recent fuel-subsidy reform experiences in Section 
2. Then, the paper presents the data and research design employed in the paper in Section 3. 
Based a comprehensive analysis of the interconnecting areas of climate and energy policy in 
Section 4, Haiti’s dynamic history forms the basis for a political economy investigation.  The 
paper thus offers formative and relevant empirical insights about such reforms in a low-income 
country. In the conclusion, the paper provides context-specific lessons from a low-income 
country relevant to recent scholarly and policy interest given the contribution that eliminating 
fossil fuel subsides may or may not make to improving development prospects in the context of 
climate and socio-ecological crisis.  
  
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The nexus of climate change and energy poverty: global and local dynamics   
The specter of climate change in the context of widespread energy poverty loom large for 
many vulnerable low income countries, especially as action to stem the use of fossil fuels has 
strengthened in recent times. The disparity concerning energy use and access among developing 
countries and more industrialized nations is evident even as several international agencies 
emphasize the transition to energy sustainability and meeting mitigation targets set out in the 
Paris Agreement [2,13,29]. Energy poverty refers to (a) lack of access to electricity grids or (b) 




stoves to satisfy household energy needs [30]. Recent research acknowledges the poverty and 
inequality effects from increases in global warming are not shared equitably among countries 
with historical responsibility for the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions, and those which 
suffer from lower standard of living due to the worst effects of climate disaster [31]. According 
to the World Energy Outlook (2018), 700 million rural households in Africa would remain 
without access to modern energy services  up to the year 2040, or about 40 per cent of the 
world’s population, with little advance to be seen to minimize the current heavy reliance on 
traditional biomass used indoors as cooking fuel [32].  
The distribution and quality of energy access varies depending on rural/urban 
geographical divides and determined by socio-technical drivers and political economic factors 
that are particularly acute in developing regions [30,33]. Part of the responsibility for these 
enduring inequities relate to the disproportionate demands made of developing countries in 
international agreements since the 2000s, including the Paris Agreement [18,22,34,35]. These 
mitigation targets which are emphasized in climate  agreements relate to expanding provision of 
renewable energy and reducing activities that do not generate greater levels of emissions [1], 
which are confronted by complex social realities and political dynamics in developing countries 
[36]. These trade-offs and tensions are not straightforward. However, for some scholars tackling 
climate change, reducing indoor pollution from wood fuels and increasing access to modern 
energy services are not mutually exclusive goals for low-income countries [37].  
In this way, policymakers can adopt an approach whereby  energy policy represents a 
series of interventions and ‘policy mixes’ that seek to target different wicked problems. However 
this strategy may be  fraught, and can bring about a series of new obstacles and unintended 




at the heart of the unequal exchange among powerful actors like multinational corporations or 
governments in advanced economies that subsidize the continued exploitation of these resources, 
foreign sale to import-dependent developing countries like Haiti, and repatriate profits from such 
activities to their headquarters [4,5]. No certain or clear path therefore exists for meeting climate 
goals and satisfying the energy needs of the population   
Other scholars argue that by approaching climate policy with a synergistic lens that seeks 
to build complementarities between mitigation-centered and adaptation-focused measures and 
activities that would generate co-benefits and simultaneously impact reducing greenhouse gases 
and assist countries and communities to internalize the effects of climate change and boost 
resilience in infrastructure, agriculture and national priority areas [2,40,41]. However, much of 
these discussions surround the technical feasibility of bringing certain administrative segments 
and new sets of policy tools together [40]. They proceed without an analytical focus on 
correcting the already existing impacts of past policies and actions that may have  created  
political asymmetries and socio-ecological crises in the first place [42,43]. Therefore, such 
technocratic discussions do not take into account the ‘non-economic costs’ and aspects of 
environmental justice: distributive, which is concerned with the uneven distribution of climate 
impacts; procedural, that is, the degree to which these discussions of, and policy responses to, 
climate change impacts are inclusive, as well as the transparency and accountability of the 
institutions addressing the needs of the most vulnerable; and recognition which refers to the 
degree of equality and equity, and the level of legitimacy given to the differentiated experiences 
of climate change [15,16,21,44,45]. 
Moreover, scholars that emphasize technical and political possibilities of combining  




claims of low-income countries [45], the political economy and geopolitical constraints [46] in 
addition to the infrastructure and cost challenges and the substitutability challenges of fossil fuels 
for renewables that arise as a result of  the aforementioned [30,47]. In other words, the ‘costs of 
transition’, that is the political costs associated with the movement from one energy regime to 
another that would affect constituencies in different ways when the new policies and socio-
political arrangements are  put in place, are not adequately considered in these conceptual 
arguments and empirical work [47,48].  
From an exogenous perspective, the power structures associated with mitigation 
discourses refer to distinct constituencies, in particular fossil fuel companies, international 
agencies and increasing climate divestment movements. The external pressures that they apply to 
countries would influence, even limit, the domestic policy options, the conceptual framework for 
policy analysis, the technical and economic resources made available, depending on the 
country’s level of development and links with international economic actors. Similarly, internal 
institutional structures including powerful interests like fuel or energy-intensive importers, 
government leaders, and the distribution of power among them would either open up or narrow 
space for political action on addressing interconnecting social development and climate issues 
[3,49,50].  
Moreover, the increased attention by international agencies  to reducing subsidies for 
fossil-based fuels has translated into significant policy attention in terms of mitigation-related 
actions by developing country governments [49,51,52]. Shifting from a rhetorical level, 
increasing amounts of resources are being directed in this respect for deep decarbonization [53]. 
Meanwhile the application of carbon taxes that place a price on polluting activities has 




however, this discrepancy  does not consider  the history of carbon emissions and the role played 
by now industrial nations.  Policy responses thus reflect the unequal power dynamics between 
poorer, which have lower levels of emissions   than rich countries [22,55], and have thus had 
limited impact on overall reductions of carbon emissions [56]. Historically, for instance in order 
to secure adequate energy supplies, advanced industrialized countries, once subsidized energy 
production in former colonies and in developing regions where they had commercial production 
activities and interests, including the Middle East [57]. An amplified concern  about subsidy 
reform in climate debates equally shows the need to integrate overseas development aid, energy 
reform or climate finance as a tool for improving for renewable energy deployment but has not 
yet been fully incorporated in the agenda [58–60].  
Overall, these developments also point to the complexity of the climate governance 
landscape as one that increasingly involves a variety of actors deploying differential means of 
influencing change, as well as the complex nature of competing priorities at the national and 
transnational scales that create contradictory economic and sustainability demands upon 
developing countries. These contradictions have in effect entered the climate policy debate [61–
63]. In developing countries such as Haiti, where a number of targeted programs were envisaged 
but lapsed in implementation before the 2018 [64], after initial announcement to remove 
subsidies, the International Monetary Fund claimed a gradual instead of full-scale removal to 
quell opposition [65] . This policy trend has prioritized efficiency improvements and created a 
new source of profits for multinational energy firms.  Broad-based social support and holistic 
developmental initiatives suffer in its stead. [8] . 
 




To offer a history of this debate, after the G20 meeting in 20091, subsidy reform resurged 
in scholarly and policy circles especially regarding why reforms are successful in some 
jurisdictions and not in others. Studies show that popular resistance to subsidy reduction or 
elimination arise due to several factors, including misinformation about the implications of 
reform, lack of social contract and trust in leadership, low-level perceptions of government 
effectiveness, and inadequate compensation for poor households that are severely impacted by 
price increases [25,26,36]. This extant corpus of work often takes the need for reform and the 
benefits of such reforms as given, without much exploration of the complex interactions and 
systemic effects of reforms that interact with the specific  socio-economic, political and 
environmental context. –The level of development, climatic vulnerability and overall access to 
energy services are often not considered prior to introducing such policy changes [61,66] . For 
instance, these factors are complicated by the prevailing conditions in Haiti and other low-
income regions. In several cases, outright public resistance has resulted in the rescindment of 
reforms or their partial reinstatement [17].  
Table 1. Recent policy developments (direct and indirect subsidies) in developing countries2 
Country  Production Consumption Nature of reforms  
Argentina  × × January to March 2017: increased electricity prices 
for most residential customer classes. Total 
consumption subsidies decreased by 35% in 2017.  
2016-2017: Production subsidies decreased by 
37%.  
                                                            
1 In its September 24-25, 2009 communique in Pittsburgh, the G20 announced its intention to take action to 
“rationalize and phase out over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful 
consumption”. Available from: http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009communique0925.html 




China   × 2014-2017: petroleum pricing reforms have cut 
down central and provincial level government 
outlays by 50% and 90%, respectively.  
Egypt   × October 2016: raised gasoline prices (RON 92) by 
35% to 3.5 EGP and diesel prices by 31% to EGP 
2.35 to reduce subsidies 
July 2017: raised prices of gasoline by 55% to EGP 
3.65 to reduce consumption transfers 
Bangladesh   × February 2017: increased gas price for power, 
industry, commercial and residential sectors to 
reduce consumption transfers 
India   × 2013-2017: fuel price liberalization reduced 
government outlays or consumption subsidies to 
oil-marketing companies by 80%  
Indonesia   × February 2017: gradually reduced subsidies and 
increased electricity prices for 900-VA customers 
by 32% 
Kuwait   × May 2017: increased electricity prices for the 
commercial sector 
Malaysia   × December 2016: increased gas prices for power 
sector and industrial customers by 7.6% to 21.20 
RM ($5.2) per MMBtu, and by 5.8% to 27.35 RM 
($6.7) per MMBtu, respectively. 
Mexico   × January 2017: LPG price liberalized to reduce the 
amount of government subsidy provision 
March 2017: liberalization of gasoline and diesel 
prices in the states of Baja California and Sonora 
Mozambique   × March 2017: increased gasoline, diesel, kerosene 
and LPG prices to reduce subsidies 
Pakistan   × January/February 2017: increased prices of 
gasoline and diesel to consumers previously 
benefitting from transfers 
Zambia   × May 2017: increased electricity tariff for all 





September 2017: plans to increase by 25%  
Adapted from OECD [67,68] 
 
This strand of research suggests that  effect of subsidy reform varies across contexts and 
constituencies, dependent upon the level of commitment to and how much groups may benefit 
from the status quo. For instance in India, protests and social unrest followed the decision to cut 
subsidies on kerosene especially among farmers and the urban middle class, where as many as 40 
percent of the population experience energy shortages and lack access to modern energy services 
[26] . Similar uprisings were witnessed within countries of varied political systems such as 
Nigeria, Jordan, Indonesia, Sudan and Iran [17,69] . Scholars have acknowledged that reasons 
for political challenges to subsidies include increased hardship on the poor and vulnerable, the 
influence of ‘vested interests’, inflationary effects, reduced competitiveness, and a potential rise 
in unemployment [24,25]. In addition, these studies utilize political economy analysis as an 
instrumental tool for incentive adjustment or for validating why ‘good’ reforms are not working 
or have not been implemented (for examples, see [69][70]). For instance, in Ecuador, political 
priorities to redistribute income to the population from natural resource rents and booms have 
confronted the international demands to keep fossil fuel assets stranded without an immediate 
mechanism that compensates those communities reliant on the resources into the future 
[21,71]These studies may however fail to acknowledge that fuel subsidies are a form of universal 
social provision that provides the basis for pro-poor developmental policies that shift the 
distribution of political and economic power and deliver public goods [72,73].  
While an increasing number of studies pay attention to the political and institutional 




social, historical and institutional dimensions of subsidy reform in the context of climate policy 
and unstable governance in territories like Haiti.. 
As international agencies make increasing demands on developing countries, recent work using 
multiple models and oil price adjustment scenarios has found that cutting all fossil fuel subsidies 
would have only a limited impact on global energy demand by 2030, and on greenhouse gas 
emissions – a reduction of between 1 and 4 per cent under both low and high oil price scenarios 
[74] . In low-income countries, where households spend a disproportionately higher share of 
income on fuel and power, there would be a negative impact by the widespread removal of 
subsidies [69] (.  Without action from large oil and gas-exporting high income groups greater 
than countries’ current National Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, 
subsidy elimination would affect fewer numbers of people in poverty [74] . It therefore follows 
that institutions largely controlled by industrialized countries are now demanding removals of 
fuel consumption subsidies in other countries consistent with prevailing macro-economic policy 
norms that seek to create new markets. These studies limit the analytical scope in this way by 
expending less effort exploring the complexity of institutional factors under conditions of already 
existing energy poverty and global inequality.  
These studies thus employ a static political economy model that assumes ceteris paribus that 
subsidy elimination will have positive economic effects, and assume that shifting from one 
policy regime to another, or re-directing some potential savings therefrom to social and public 
services will automatically have developmental effects. Accordingly, the assumed misallocation 
of resources would have benefits in reducing consumption of fossil energy sources and provoke 
an automatic shift towards renewable energy [75]. These narrow political economy studies a 




of power. The demand and supply of fossil fuels are not equally tackled and the infrastructural 
and institutional requirements for equitable renewable energy provision in low-income countries 
are relegated and market access is promoted. As a result, currently, already rich countries do not 
receive the same levels of pressure to contribute to rapid decarbonization,  maintain current 
levels of subsidies and goals for increasing output growth. .  
 
3. Data and research design 
The study adopts a single case study research design and inductive research strategy. The 
investigation thus delves deeply into the global and local political configurations that have 
historically, and in more contemporary times affected discussions about energy and climate 
policy in Haiti. This history is replete with the multiple crises and experience of energy 
dependence and biophysical and human adaptations to disaster and unequal power in Haiti that 
have stressed the outsized role of international players in the country’s political economy 
[23,27,76]. As one of the most vulnerable countries globally to the effects of climate change   – 
with relatively limited financial and technical resources to address the threat [5,60] , an 
examination of recent reform approach can offer formative and useful insights about such 
experiences in a low-income country. Haiti’s dynamic history offers useful evidence for analysis 
of the nature, type and range of interventions from domestic and international political actors in 
energy that have worked or not worked related to its use, production and availability.. 
3.1 Data Sources and sampling 
To do this,  a number sources of data collection and approaches to tracing and explaining 
these policy arenas were utilised namely documentary analysis, a constructed database, public 




useful in order to substantiate findings across data sets and thus minimize the effect of potential 
biases in the research design [77,78]. First, this study utilizes relevant aspects of a bespoke 
database that was constructed based on multiple international sources of climate finance drawing 
primarily upon multilateral donors’ aid like multilateral fund databases such as the Global 
Environment Facility, Green Climate Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank to Haiti 
in the area of energy and climate-related projects [60]. This database contained ongoing projects 
that were classified as either mitigation, adaptation or both, but most were initiated during or 
after 2015. This database helped demonstrate the degree of policy coherence – i.e. how national 
priorities are met and funded and the areas to which international funding is directed. The 
database also gave information about past and ongoing mitigation and adaptation projects based 
on region, scale and effectiveness, the attendant the internal political context and contestation 
between national stakeholders and policy officials and demands of international financiers [see 
60] .  
A number of published, unpublished reports, historical materials and newspaper reports and 
existing secondary literature about events that led to the decision to eliminate fossil fuel 
consumption subsidies were consulted. This secondary information provided the context, 
motivations and responses of various sections of society and powerful interests including the 
government, donors, citizens, the diaspora, and the international players, in particular the IMF 
integral in the subsidy reform attempt. The main policy documents were identified by officials of 
the Ministry of the Environment and the United Nations Development Program who confirmed 
their representativeness and relevance during the field visits in April to November 2018. 
Learning about the process and underlying tensions of decision-making power and perspectives 




dynamics. The corpus of policies were selected based on a purposive sampling technique using 
the annotated  document to draw out the relevant policies from a broader database of policies on 
related issues and included those from the early 2000s to 2017. The end result was a sample of 
eight documents from 2006 to 2017 that focused on both mitigation and adaptation (see Table 2 
below). In addition, it contextualized the database and other publicly available data on energy 
production, imports and consumption, CO2 emissions and electricity production from the 
International Energy Agency, International Monetary Fund, U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, and the World Bank. Reports and data were also obtained from the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank which detailed their advice and decisions taken by authorities in 
Haiti on the macroeconomic and social policy aspects related to fuel subsidy in Haiti. Table 2. 
Climate and energy-related policies under analysis  
Climate Policies  
1. National Climate Change Policy (2015) 
 
2. National Adaptation Plan of Action (2006 and 2017) 
 
3. National Determined Contribution (2015)  
 
4. 1st and 2nd National Communiqué on Climate Actions  
 
5. National Plan for the management of risks and disasters  
 
Energy-related Policies  
6. Haiti Energy Sector Development Plan (2007-2017) 
 
7. National plan for a sustainable energy system in Haiti 
 
8. Scaling Up Energy Program  
 
Source: Author.  
The combination of these sources offered much insight into the conditions that led to the recent 




3.2 Data analysis procedures  
The paper employed document analysis. This method provided background information 
and historical insight into past and contemporary efforts by the national government to tackle 
climate change.  
The main policy documents were first analyzed and summarized as an annotated document to 
show the main issues of concern, stakeholders involved and policy objectives. Then, a 
comparison of the main policies were undertaken to draw out the main themes relevant to 
climate action and energy issues, the actions, design instruments and policy outcomes that 
constituted political and development agenda. These materials were further analyzed where 
selective passages that took into account the major themes of the study to understand the global 
and domestic political arrangements and their impacts on energy provision and climate action in 
the areas of adaptation and mitigation. These passages provided the basis to explore the relative 
weight given to mitigation/adaptation priorities of and funding provided by international 
agencies and donors in the consumption subsidy debate shown in the database, as well as social 
and political considerations defined at a national level. This final procedure thus involved 
corroborating elements from the constructed database, newspaper accounts, the relevant policy 
proposals and outputs and triangulation of documentary evidence with insights from fieldwork 
visits [77].   
In order to draw certain causal linkages and explain the relationship between the energy 
sector and climate change policies through a historical cartography, the paper utilizes process 
tracing technique [78,79]. It shows how policy focus on adaptation concerns have been 
prioritized as opposed to mitigation linked to energy subsidy reform creating a fragmented 




are interlinked with the nature of the political economy, reliance on and power of foreign energy 
producers, and the failure of subsidy reform to respond to social and political concerns and to 
take account of the development context that is increasingly defined by climate change [80]. The 
researcher’s presence during the ‘justice riots’ of July 2018 and discussions with various actors 
within government and outside especially stakeholder workshops. Field visits thus provided 
much needed contextual insight about general conditions, institutional politics, justice claims and 
political tensions. These investigations excavated important nuances about climate justice and 
how power imbalances affect policy coherence to address Haiti’s major climate-energy and 
shaped ongoing challenges by the population to the status quo. The next sections offers an 
historical account of the evolution of the use and production of energy in Haiti.  
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
4.1 The historical and institutional context  
 
Haiti is situated on the western part of the island of Hispaniola, located in the Northern 
Caribbean Sea with a population of 10.6 million inhabitants whose colonial and political history 
affect its current development. The country’s widespread impoverishment and marginalization  
and ecological degradation make Haiti particularly susceptible to climate change. About 96 
percent of its population are exposed to natural hazards, with 80 percent of extremely poor 
households and 70 percent of moderately poor households experience an average of at least two 
environmental shocks per year [81]. The vast majority of the extreme poor (80 per cent) live in 
rural areas, where agriculture provides livelihood for nearly 70% of Haitians, through small-scale 




related deaths in Haiti resulted from floods and landslides caused by hurricanes and 
environmental  episodes and exacerbated by the country’s steep landscape, unsteady slopes, and 
widespread deforestation. Its geographic location in the Atlantic hurricane belt as well as its 
landscape, land use practices,  high levels of inequality, high population density, dependence on 
foreign aid, and inadequate infrastructure and public services contribute significantly to its 
climate vulnerability [80,82](. According to Germanwatch3, which publishes the Global Climate 
Risk Index, based on data from 1997 to 2016, Haiti ranks among the top three countries most 
exposed to extreme weather events like storms, flooding, and droughts [83]. According to this 
study, in 2016, in terms of climate change related impacts, the country incurred up to 17.2 per 
cent loss of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 613 deaths amounting to 5.65 per 100,000 
inhabitants. In October 2016 alone, Hurricane Matthew caused catastrophic damage in the 
country, an estimated value of US$ 2.8 billion, or 32% of GDP [84]. According to Haiti’s 
Nationally Determined Contribution (2015), adaptation and mitigation needs amount 
toUS$25.387 billion – mitigation estimated at US$8.773 and adaptation a further US$16.614 
billion [85].  
 
4.2 Mapping the energy sector in Haiti  
 
 The history of energy in Haiti is tied to its history as a former colony and relationship 
with external forces that have exploited its natural resources and enslaved African labour to  
establish a  lucrative plantation economy. European powers brought destructive environmental 
                                                            
3 Germanwatch collects its data for enumerating the Global Climate Risk Index from the NatCatSERVICE database 





practices and systems of exploitation and sought to create a colony that drew heavily on the land 
and its natural resources  to produce for profit for traders and merchant planters. After a major  
revolution in 1791 led by enslaved leaders, Haiti declared its independence in 1804 and have 
suffered the consequences of this bold feat that resulted in the new Black nation paying 
considerable external debt of 150 million francs to France for the latter to recognize its 
sovereignty  [27]. From henceforth, the wrangling between external and internal forces for 
control and sovereignty has persisted. It exploitative economic structure and unstable political 
climate were also a product of this revolutionary and complicated past. . With its colonization 
and establishment as one of the richest sugar territories in the Caribbean, it became reliant on and 
fell into the  sphere of American corporate influence  (especially during the early 20th century 
occupation) for fossil fuel energy sources to drive agricultural exports of sugar, lumber and 
coffee[27,42].  Its history thus represented a shift from a degree of resource independence to a 
position of reliance on external authority and successive interventions and embargoes imposed 
by foreign powers [27,42]. In modern times, foreign interventions  have precipitated unbalanced 
socio-economic conditions and environmental degradation have generated ongoing crises [23].  
Increasingly, wood resources became commodities that enabled Haitians to earn an income that 
was hitherto not possible, and later became a ready source of fuel for households.  
The 1973 Arab oil embargo that spiked international oil prices and reduced imports for 
countries, at the time, unable to acquire goods and primary energy resources  from abroad, which 
prompted the massive use of wood fuels across developing countries [86]. One study highlighted 
an example of a 1978 USAID project that sought to develop low-cost rural technologies for food, 
fuel, power and water systems but was inappropriate for the Haitian context [87]. Haiti’s massive 




use of wood for export to gain foreign exchange to pay its burdening debts [88]. Due to a lack of 
readily available alternative sources of energy, wood fuel and charcoal make up about 80 per 
cent of the country’s primary energy supply (see figure 1), with 95 per cent of households using 
charcoal as the main source of cooking [89]. Over time, the  promotion of markets, 
predominance by foreign powers controlling local resources and inconsistent domestic policies, 
and  instability have contributed to an ever-increasing dependence on foreign sources of energy 
to meet commercial and household needs.  
 
Figure 1. Energy Supply by sources (1990-2015)  
 



















Figure 2. Net energy imports (% of energy use) Haiti
 
source: World Bank Development Indicators (IEA records)  
As Figure 2 illustrates, energy imports started to pick up in mid 1970s, just after the global 
energy crisis in 1973, and fluctuated based on domestic needs and political circumstances. In 
1993, a major political shock occurred in Haiti when the United Nations Security Council passed 
a resolution that imposed a worldwide fuels and arms embargo against Haiti that ran until 1995. 
This was complicated by a political standoff between the US Navy and Haitian army, the latter at 
the time opposed the return of elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the country. This 
precipitated a rapid decline in the availability of oil fuels and return to use of wood and charcoal 
(see figure 1).  
Given the general level of impoverishment in Haiti, energy poverty plays a major role in 
the country’s level of development, as many as 75 and 85 per cent of the population can be 














urban Port-au-Prince have access to electricity supply where outages are regular. Supplies offer 
coverage of a few hours of electricity access a day across several parts of the country, with rural 
areas chronically under-supplied. The country further became dependent on fossil fuel imports, 
amounting to around 85 per cent of energy provision, with hydroelectric power through the 
Péligre hydroelectric plant offering the remainder [90]. Haiti has one of the highest costs for 
electricity in the Western Hemisphere of $0.35/kWh, above the Caribbean regional rate of 
US$0.33 per kWh, with fuel imports for electricity valued at 7 per cent of annual gross domestic 
product (GDP) [91]. High energy costs have been supplemented by development aid for 
electricity access using primarily fossil fuels [5,82]4. At the domestic level, consumption 
subsidies for electricity generation is estimated at US$300 million that is primarily directed at the 
state-owned utility Electricité d’Haïti (EDH) that has monopoly rights [91]. Haiti’s per capita use 
of electricity is the lowest in the Caribbean area and one of the lowest in the world with an 
estimated 36 kWh annual electricity consumption rate per person [91].  The population’s access 
to energy has been shaped by ongoing geopolitical games and externally-funded budgetary 
constraints and requirements that have increasingly been led by the United States and other 




Figure 3. Electricity production by renewable sources (1971-2015)  
                                                            
4 On a per capita basis, it is among the lowest in the Caribbean, only followed by Trinidad and Tobago, which is an 





Source: World Development Indicators, IEA Statistics (http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp) 
 
Fortunately, in 2005, the country entered into the PetroCaribe agreement with Venezuela 
that aimed to support its economic and social development [82,92]. This program signified a 
temporary shift in geopolitics of the region, and created new dependencies, whereby Venezuela 
would become an influential player to recraft a new hemispheric anti-neoliberal alliance [92]. 
PetroCaribe supplied fuel at concessional rates offering a ninety-day payment schedule for fifty 
per cent value of oil imports, while 25 per cent was a direct credit to the receiving government, 
and remaining 25 per cent appropriated for social and economic projects of the importing 
country. The balance is payable within a 25 year period at a one per cent rate of interest and a 
grace period of two years. Haiti has received about US$2 billion in PetroCaribe support that was 
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relationship with Venezuela. 14,000 barrels of oil per day were supplied to the Bureau de 
monetization des programmes d’aide au développement, which in turn was sold to local 
companies [93]. Haiti opted in part to repay in food and agricultural products.  
After taking office in 2016, President Jovenel Moïse promised to radically reduce energy 
poverty among Haitians to ‘make universal and reliable access to energy a key factor of 
economic development’ by focusing on rate collections and renewable energy [94]. Late in 2018, 
by which time political and economic turmoil in Venezuela threatened the viability of 
Petrocaribe, civil society actors charged corruption within the PetroCaribe arrangement after the 
publication of two commissioned reports by the country’s Senate in 2016 and 2017. These 
reports showed that many of the earmarked projects were not undertaken. On 17 October 2018, 
an estimated 10000 to 15000 Haitians marched in the streets in 31 locations across the country, 
with the biggest crowds in the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince. The protest movement 
demanded improved delivery of social services, and accused President Jovenel Moïse and other 
office holders of corruption, eventually calling for the government’s resignation and fresh 
elections.  
 
4.3 Haiti’s fuel subsidy reform  
With growing fuel shortages after the PetroCaribe deal unraveled, Haiti started 
experiencing an unstable and precarious supply.  The government contracted US-based 
multinational companies to fill the gap. Haiti thus had to return to international markets for fuel 
supplies. The government imported as many as 22000 barrels of oil per day in November 2018. 




exports and benefitted from this new arrangement as the government debt obligations to the 
company increased. News reports in January and February 2019 indicated that due to non-
payment of US$35 million, its major supplier Novum Energy refused to supply to its major city. 
More than 60,000 barrels of gasoline and 260,000 barrels of diesel remained anchored off the 
bay of Port-au-Prince awaiting for payment from the government. Competition between two 
foreign suppliers Novum and DINASA followed but not to the benefit of Haitians. Both 
submitted   bids after a dispute with the government that saw the contract canceled stirring 
concerns about further shortages. Fuel scarcity and mounting economic difficulties put basic 
necessities increasingly out of reach for Haitians, despite a $229 million loan programme with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that was initiated in March 2019 [95].  
Figure 4. Energy production and consumption - Haiti (1980-2015)
 


























Figure 5. Electricity generation by fuel source (quinquennial averages) (1990-2015)  
 
Source: IEA Electricity Information 2017 - https://webstore.iea.org/electricity-information 
 
Since the 2010 earthquake, and the massive dislocation it caused, the government 
instituted fuel subsidies. From 2011-2013, fuel subsidies were estimated at 2.9 per cent of Gross 
Domestic Product, of which 2.7 per cent was electricity and 0.2 per cent to fuel support largely 
financed through the PetroCaribe agreement [64,96]. According to the IMF,  subsidies for 
nonrenewable energy sources amounted to US$0.49 billion in 2013. ]. Since 2014, with the 
decline of international energy prices, when the last fuel price increase of 7 per cent was made, 
little reform had been made to fuel subsidies. Yet, the global energy slump  had effectively 
















In 2015, the Haitian government of entered a three-year Extended Credit Facility (ECF) 
agreement, Haiti would receive US$69.7 million in order to ‘raise Haiti’s growth potential and 
reduce vulnerabilities to shocks, while entrenching macroeconomic stability’5. In February 2018, 
in an effort to fast-track implementation and consolidate reforms, the Haitian government also 
agreed to an IMF staff-monitored program (SMP)6 that incorporated a number of fiscal and 
macro-economic measures, including the removal of the fuel subsidy7.The July 2018 decision 
therefore cannot be seen in isolation but as a result of IMF pressure and policy constraints to 
reduce (and potentially eliminate) fuel subsidies that would have translated to a 38 percent 
increase in gasoline prices, and 47 percent hike for diesel and 51 percent for kerosene arising as 
part of the agreement with the IMF [65]. The government was also required to implement several 
structural reforms, including a public financial management and reserves monitoring programme, 
electricity sector restructuring to contain losses from the state-run utility, and the adoption of an 
automatic fuel pricing mechanism to prepare for imposition of fuel taxes, in the event that oil 
prices rebounded [81].  
An update to the program indicated that the government and the IMF authorities also 
agreed on the need for social measures to help alleviate the impact of the subsidy reform on the 
most vulnerable sections of the population8. On July 6, 2018, the government attempted to 
eliminate the subsidy spurring violent protests and social unrest throughout the capital city and 
main towns, during which two people died, provoking the Prime Minister to reverse the decision 
soon thereafter . The riots led to the resignation of the entire Cabinet. As a result of these 
                                                            
5 IMF, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/14/01/49/pr15231 
6 The SMP is a short-term agreement that the Fund specifies is designed to build a track record of adherence to the 
economic program. 
7 IMF, Feb 25, 2018 https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/02/26/pr1868-haiti-imf-staff-reaches-staff-level-
agreement-with-haiti-on-smp 




developments, the IMF countered that instead the Haitian government should take a more 
‘gradual approach’ to eliminating the subsidy with the introduction of transportation vouchers 
and social compensation to those deemed to be most affected. These initiatives have yet to be 
implemented, nor have authorities adopted a more strategic view of development. Subsequently, 
the World Bank offered a US$20 million grant for strengthen fiscal management and enhance the 
efficiency of social spending all the while trying to curb any resistance as opposed to 
encouraging a broader developmental outlook [81], as a precursor to the US229 million loan 
from the IMF. These events leading to and following the reform attempt shows the lingering 
effects of external powers in shouldering the national budget. Such effects include botched 
policies contributed to extensive vulnerability to external environmental shocks and outright 
violent riots expressed in the uneven approach to climate policy.  
 
4.4 Analysis of main energy and climate policies  
Moreover, external demands made to carry out reform of subsidy regimes have 
increasingly been linked to climate policy [18,19,24]. However, these policy discussions do not 
distinguish between the conditions of developing countries and advanced countries, the latter of 
which are historically responsible for the majority of emissions. In Haiti, the ongoing struggles to 
meet the development needs of the country by civil and state actors have resulted in a number of 
policy proposals as noted in Table 1 to address the links between climate adaptation and 
mitigation [40]. It appears that these package of proposals have also created new dependencies in 
the area of climate change policy. For instance, aid in the area of in climate change or climate-
related projects in Haiti, a new database reveals, has amounted to  US$1.1 billion invested by 




are directed towards climate-related or energy projects sourced from the World Bank, IDB, 
Switzerland, and Japan. The tension between national priorities decided for the most part by 
Haitian authorities between mitigation and adaptation is apparent, with $773 million dedicated to 
climate change or sustainable energy [60]. Change in consumption subsidies featured within a 
single project in this database showing that governmental authorities wish to prioritize adaptation 
[60] but are being pressured to meet other external demands. At the macro-level, the greater 
focus on adaptation in the overall funding, while represented by higher levels of funding, has not 
improved resilience due to the incongruence among the political, economic and environmental 
objectives of donors. Their onerous demands are also insufficiently  democratically negotiated 
and managed with the Haitian public.  
Turning to its main policies, Haiti’s National Energy Policy (2007-2017) outlines a goal 
to achieve 30 per cent reduction in energy intensity by 2030, 50% of electricity from renewable 
sources by 2020, and 50% electrification rate by 2020 [97]. With respect to consumption 
subsidies, the Plan indicated a concern to expand liquefied petroleum gas and kerosene through 
new investments and not direct subsidies to consumers. Similar to the investment database 
above, increased attention was given to decreasing consumption by introducing energy efficiency 
measures such as the distribution of subsidized energy-efficient lamps to poor households 
connected to grid which earmarked distribution of 200,000 lamp to  save of 1 million US$ in 
electricity bills [97]. In addition, its Second Communication to the UNFCC [98] noted that in 
2000, the energy, forestry, waste and agriculture sectors emitted 1447.66 Gg of CO2.  Per capita 
emissions in 2014 were also estimated at 0.2 tCO29. In 2018, overall greenhouse gas emissions in 
Haiti accounted for less than one-tenth of 1 per cent of total global emissions indicating that the 





level of subsidization of energy projects does not compound the problem to a great degree, and 
any removal in this area may further contribute to already under-resourced area [88].    
Previously, perhaps in response to donors’ priorities and the Paris agreement, the 
country’s climate policies have paid a great deal of attention to renewable energy. The country’s 
NDC aimed to increase to 47% the share of renewable energies in the Haitian electricity system 
(hydro-power 24.5, wind 9.4%, solar 7.5 per cent, biomass 5.6%), as well as reduce wood fuel 
consumption by 32 per cent by 2030 [85]. Preliminary estimates for renewable energy in wind at 
10MW, hydro-power at 50 MW and 1654MW in solar and 40 in biomass [99 Table 3].  Targets 
will be achieved through greater private sector participation which will benefit from fiscal 
incentives assigning more influence to multinationals over the energy transition to renewables, as 
well as other measures to cut greenhouse gas emissions [85,100]. From this analysis, in the 
database, of the US$197 million to renewable, energy efficiency and bio-fuels projects, only one 
project aimed merely at providing a communication mechanism between experts and local 
policy-makers supported by the World Bank costing US$2.7 million. Expansion of energy 
supplies and markets in various small-scale ventures appear to be the main goal of this program. 
In addition, the Haiti Sustainable Energy Programme (HSE) represents an important component 
of reducing dependence on fossil fuels. The programme also outlines the expansion of grid-
connected renewable energy systems in hydro, wind, solar, geothermal and biomass [90]10. 
Similarly, the unconditional component of the NDC aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 
5% under the reference scenario, while the conditional mitigation goal involves an additional 
26% reduction, predicated upon receipt of international assistance under the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities. Mitigation priorities include a transformation of its 
                                                            




energy sector to reduce the country’s dependence on fossil fuels that will improve its balance of 
payments and contribute to overall reduction of its carbon emissions. This 31 % overall 
reduction in GHG emissions represents an onerous challenge for a low income country to shift 
resources that may be otherwise utilized for universal programs to address energy poverty.  
 
Figure 4. CO2 Emissions by energy source (1980-2015)  
 
Source: Author, based on data from U.S. Energy Information Administration 
Additionally, to address its GHG emissions targets, the government pledged to introduce 
financing of forest mitigation programs, as well as grants and low-interest loans for the 
establishment of sustainable forest management systems, energy efficient improvements, and 
technology transfer, especially incentives and research and development [98]. Again, it is unclear 
whether these actions have materialized, but there are clear tensions that exist in following 
through with activities that will bring national and local interests in alignment with external 








































































































































































political risk were noted by donors that would affect the project. In other cases, funds were 
withheld as certain aspects were not carried out in a timely manner. Haitian authorities are 
required therefore follow the funding and demands, and pursue piecemeal initiatives that overall 
have limited impact on improving long-term environmental and social conditions for its citizens.  
 Finally, the discussion on mitigation and adaptation project objectives have given little 
notice of the many interests and constituencies that come to bear on climate policy decisions that 
largely respond to external pressures. In response, however, Haitian officials have shown a 
capability to creatively ‘satisfice’, maneuver to make ad hoc arrangements, and try to effectively 
reframe climate/environmental concerns to an international audience that have resulted in 
additional support over time. From this perspective, Haiti’s ambitions to address its acute 
vulnerability is limited by its policy space resulting from its current institutional relationships 
with powerful external players.  The manner in which projects are defined and then implemented 
are top-down and pay little regard to the institutional, structural and political context. These 
projects regard highly technocratic considerations about implementation over relatively short 
project cycles. Few ever make any mention of longer-term injustices and imbalances in global 
and local structures of decision-making power that have generated the high level of ecological 
and social exposure to the worst effects of climate change [42]. These conditions are equally 
replicated in the policies that have focus on energy and climate but their overall positive effects 
are uneven. These realities justify little the focus by the IMF and other external powers on 
reduction of subsidies. The immediate shock that this proposal caused and the political instability 
and unrest that is now underway have illuminated the undemocratic nature of the relationship 





Conclusion: lessons from an integrated analysis  
The demands made by international agencies to reduce and eventually eliminate fuel 
consumption subsidies demonstrates the excessive burden on developing countries. Historical 
factors and the struggle to confront international forces have created multiple development 
challenges in Haiti, like high fuel costs, low rates of electrification, social inequity, poverty, and 
high dependence on fossil fuel imports. Policy makers have focused more attention on reducing 
subsidies as a means to obtain fiscal support on the top of existing debt burdens, to gain the 
‘credibility’ of lenders and private sector that do not directly meet the needs of their populations. 
Political economy questions have therefore arisen to the extent of the pressures of external 
players versus local actors that help explain these conflicting policy priorities and uneven 
outcomes. This article aimed to question the assumptions of these political economy studies and 
broaden understanding of decarbonization relevant to a low-income nation, centering the analysis 
of fuel subsidy reform in Haiti within climate policy that expands justice for its citizens.   
This approach is important as the subsidy debate has placed additional pressure on low-
income and marginalized groups in least developed countries, most recently in Ecuador and 
Haiti, and no similar pressure or burden on rich countries with the highest historical records for 
greenhouse gas emissions. This represents an enduring imbalance and injustice especially as 
countries struggle to confront the climate crisis, and simultaneously address development 
concerns. In Haiti, challenging and polarizing political circumstances has historically impinged 
on critical policy decisions, and in this case has triggered ongoing political tensions, protests and 
energy supply shortages from which foreign corporations have handsomely benefitted. I have 




particular its dependence on fossil fuel imports, access to development finance and acute 
exposure to the worst effects of climate change interact in complex ways.  
Moreover, climate policy scholars have proffered measures such as improving ‘energy 
access and energy security, reducing local air pollution and increasing economic efficiency’ 
through access to renewable sources [101] that assumes that fossil fuel energy is easily 
substitutable with renewable sources. In Haiti, existing poor infrastructure and lack of fiscal 
autonomy aggravate dependence and reinforce the existing social order. Policy options are 
limited in real terms and are decided outside of democratic deliberation. It is important that 
research on these questions create synergies in the analysis of the social, political, historical and 
institutional factors as a critical first step. Considering the varying levels of analysis of policy, 
and understanding how constituencies linked to various adaptation or mitigation priorities 
exercise their interests can offer new avenues for analyzing conditions for alternative options that 
tackle climate justice at an international and local levels.  
Local disenfranchised actors and their concerns must therefore drive such a framing and 
their political capacity to organize and democratically devise solutions expanded to the extent 
that they may exercise some form of self-determination. In other words, external players should 
not act in quasi-dictatorial or paternalistic manner that undermine already existing support 
structures or impede the formation of new solidarities in the community to address their 
concerns. These multiple considerations enable deeper thinking to define the climate ‘policy 
space’, as Haitians challenge the neoliberal  consensus and orthodoxy that incapacitates 
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